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ABSTRACT 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to utilize the mathematical approach to demand estimation 
developed in Culp (2004) to compare two common emissions based taxes. The model assumes 
Cournot-Nash behavior and divides the automobile market into five homogenous segments. A global 
optimization program is utilized to mathematically determine the range of values the coefficients of 
demand must take in each segment to satisfy market equilibrium. Simulations were performed to 
examine the comparative impact on social welfare of both the per mile emission tax (PMET) and the 
lump sum emission tax (LSET) in the automotive and travel markets. In the simulations, a global 
optimization program allows market conditions to change while holding constant the level of 
pollution reduction, satisfying the other constraints of the model, and satisfying each firm’s first 
order profit-maximizing conditions. 
 
The simulation found that in five of the thirty-two quarters examined, and regardless of market 
conditions, that the LSET produced more gains from trade. In simulations of the remaining 
quarters, the outcomes varied depending upon the cross price elasticity of vehicle demand and upon 
the sensitivity of consumers to vehicle operating cost. 
 
The simulations also show that an approximately 20 percent reduction in emissions from new 
vehicles is achieved by the LSET with a median tax rate of $155.74 per gram of average CO 
emissions per mile. Consequently, a vehicle that emits an average of two grams of CO per mile 
would pay a one-time fee of $311.48. The median tax rate required by the PMET is $0.00666 per 
gram per mile. Accordingly, a vehicle that emits two grams of CO per mile on average would pay 
$0.0103 per mile or $1332.46 for every 100,000 miles traveled. The difference between the two tax 
rates, required to achieve the same pollution reduction goal, is likely the result of consumer’s 
insensitivity to the rise in vehicle operating costs caused by the PMET. This result is consistent with 
the view that consumers highly discount future payments.  
 
 
THE SIMULATION OF THE EFFECT OF PMET AND LSET  
 
n this paper, an abatement cost function will be specified and used to determine how the LSET and 
PMET changes each firm’s first-order conditions and how these new first-order conditions change market 
outcomes. 
 
 A per mile emissions tax (PMET) is an emissions tax which is paid each year by the consumer based upon 
the vehicle’s total estimated emissions over the period. Such a tax is based upon the number of miles driven and the 
emissions per mile of the vehicle. Vehicles with higher emissions would pay a higher tax for the same number of 
miles driven. Proponents argue such a tax could be collected each year at vehicle registration upon inspection of 
I 
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number of miles driven during the year. The PMET tax seeks to reduce pollution in two ways:  by raising the cost of 
travel, particularly for those with higher emission vehicles, and second by increasing automakers production of lower 
emission vehicles in response to consumers’ increased demand for lower emission caused by the per mile emissions 
tax.   
 
 A lump sum emissions tax (LSET) seeks to reduce emissions from vehicles by encouraging producers to 
produce lower emission vehicles by making the automaker pay a one-time tax based upon the emissions 
characteristics of the vehicle. Higher emission vehicles produced by the automakers would pay a higher tax than lower 
emission vehicles. Since the LSET is not paid per mile driven, the LSET does not change the cost of travel and 
therefore has no effect on vehicle miles traveled. 
 
To estimate the effect of the PMET on automobile demand, gasoline prices are used as a proxy for the 
PMET. The PMET increases the cost of vehicle travel and consumers should respond to an increase in operating costs 
caused by the PMET the same way they respond to an increase in operating costs caused by changes in gasoline 
prices.  
 
To estimate the effect of the LSET on automobile demand is less complex since consumers should react to 
increases in the LSET the same as they would react to increases in vehicle prices. Therefore, estimating the effect of 
the LSET on demand should be equivalent to estimating the effect of a per unit tax. 
 
The next step is to simulate how the changes in demand resulting from taxation will affect firm behavior and 
thus equilibrium output, pricing, and producer and consumer surplus. For the PMET, a firm will decide to implement 
new pollution abatement technology to counter the tax-driven changes in demand if two conditions are met: 1) the 
addition of pollution abatement technology can be linked in the minds of consumers as making a vehicle cheaper to 
operate and therefore more desirable. 2) The firm expects its profits to increase enough from the increase in demand 
caused by implementing the new abatement technology to pay for the costs of lowered emissions. The first condition 
is met, as stated earlier, because consumers are assumed to react to each tax as they have reacted to changes in 
gasoline prices. The second condition depends on the increase in production costs resulting from producing lower 
emission vehicles. The increase in production costs will be given by a reasonable function that fits the assumption of 
increasing implementation costs per additional unit of pollution reduction. 
 
It is assumed each automaker will produce all vehicles within a segment using the same chosen technology 
rather than applying different designs. In addition the technology chosen will only require simple changes that add 
cost to each vehicle but need little equipment or capital expenditures to implement. It is also assumed that all firms 
have access to this abatement technology and therefore each automaker will choose the same level of pollution 
reduction for each segment. The firm is assumed to benefit only from the improved price and sales of its vehicles due 
to the reduction in tax. Although there may be other ―good-will‖ benefits, these benefits will be ignored. 
 
DATA  
 
The data for this analysis is taken from Culp (2004) and refers to the 32 quarters of pricing and output 
observations of the automobile market from 1989-1996. Vehicle prices were obtained from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey and vehicle sales information was obtained from Ward’s Automotive. 
 
BASIS OF THE ABATEMENT COST FUNCTION  
 
To ensure that the abatement cost function does not exceed the cost of existing technology, propane and 
natural gas powered vehicles were chosen as representative methods of emission reductions and the abatement 
function adapted to fit closely the cost of adopting these available technologies. Since any form of abatement with a 
greater cost than propane or natural gas for the same level of abatement would not be chosen by firms, these 
technologies represent the high end of abatement costs. Therefore, the abatement function for each segment will be 
adjusted not to exceed the cost of this technology. Propane and natural gas were chosen not only because the cost of 
adopting this technology is well-known but also because they achieve significant pollution reduction without 
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significantly changing vehicle characteristics, new vehicles can be easily converted to their use, and because much of 
the infrastructure needed to supply this alternative fuel to consumers already exists. Therefore, propane and natural 
gas are good indicators of the maximum amount firms will be willing to spend for similar levels of pollution 
reduction. 
 
PRODUCTION COSTS OF LOWER EMISSION VEHICLES BY SEGMENT 
 
This paper focuses on carbon monoxide emissions (CO) since the health impacts of CO emissions are well 
known and these emissions are greater than any other ground level pollutant. Additionally, other pollutants such as 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that cause ozone tend to be reduced when CO is 
reduced. 
 
Vehicles are grouped into three emissions categories as determined by the EPA: Ultra low emission vehicles, 
standard car emissions under Tier 1, and standard truck emissions under Tier 1. Tier 1 was the required emissions for 
vehicles by 1994.  
 
Ultra low emission vehicles tend to be in the small car segment and emit 2.1 grams of CO per mile or less. 
Standard cars under Tier 1 include all vehicles except pickups and SUVs. They are required to emit less than 4.2 
grams of CO per mile. Truck emissions include pickups and SUVs and are required to emit less than 5.5 grams of CO 
per mile.   
 
The reason for the splitting vehicles into three emissions categories is that vehicles of different size and 
performance are going to require different levels of pollution abatement and consequently be more expensive. Table 1 
was constructed from information provided by the Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition. It indicates the additional cost per 
vehicle for producing propane and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles in place of gasoline engines and the 
resulting emissions. 
 
The cost of compressed natural gas vehicles is more than propane because natural gas must be stored at a 
higher pressure requiring much sturdier storage tanks. The cost of implementing propane and compressed natural gas 
varies depending on how large the storage capacity must be to deliver similar driving ranges. For smaller vehicles, the 
lower end of each estimate would be most appropriate, while for larger vehicles the higher end of each estimate would 
most accurately reflect the cost to implement.  
 
 
Table 1: Cost of Emissions Reduction from Selected Alternate Fuels 
 
Fuel 
Additional 
production 
cost per vehicle 
Pollution 
reduction 
CO Emissions compared to 
gasoline engine with 2.1 
grams of CO per mile 
CO Emissions compared to 
gasoline engine with 4.2 
grams of CO per mile 
CO Emissions compared to 
gasoline engine with 5.5 
grams of CO per mile 
Propane $1000-$2000 60% 0.84 1.68 2.20 
CNG $4000-$6000 90% 0.21 0.42 0.55 
 
 
For example, Table 1 shows that if a gasoline engine that currently emits 2.1 grams of CO per mile is 
converted to propane, the vehicle will cost an additional $1000-2000, but emissions will be reduced from 2.1 to only 
0.84 grams of CO per mile. When the same vehicle is converted to CNG, the vehicle will cost an additional $4000-
$6000, but emissions will be reduced from 2.1 to only 0.21 grams of CO per mile.  
 
An abatement cost function was selected to be consistent with the mathematical criteria of diminishing 
returns and increasing cost. In particular, the abatement function was specified to take the following mathematical 
form: 
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Emissions per mile =
cost  vehicleadditional
mileper  grams CO$x 
                      (1) 
 
where the x is adjusted based upon the size of the vehicle. Vehicles in each segment were placed in the emissions 
category that most closely represents their emissions level as of 1989: X is $840 for small vehicles, $2200 for pickups, 
$2200 for SUVs, $1680 for luxury vehicles, and $1680 for large cars. 
 
 The abatement constant is simply adjusted to represent the different levels of emissions produced by vehicles 
with different sizes and characteristics for the same additional cost. For example, for the same additional amount spent 
on abatement equipment, larger vehicles will probably produce more emissions per mile than small vehicles. 
Therefore, the abatement constant is adjusted depending on the emissions characteristics of the current vehicle with a 
larger constant representing the increased difficulty of emissions reduction.  
 
The abatement function exhibits diminishing returns and it yields results for each category of vehicles that 
are comparable to the pollution reduction actually achieved by propane and natural gas when the abatement constant is 
adjusted according to the vehicle category. For example, a vehicle that currently emits 2.1 grams of CO per mile using 
gasoline can have its emissions reduced to 0.84 grams of CO per mile for $1000-$2000 per vehicle using propane, or 
reduced to 0.21 for between $4000-6000 using compressed natural gas. The estimated abatement function should be 
consistent with this information, and the abatement constant in each segment was chosen so that this would be 
accomplished. When the abatement constant in the abatement function show in equation 1 is set to a value of $840, 
spending $1000 on abatement equipment causes emissions to be 0.84. This matches the $1000-2000 known cost of 
converting a small size vehicle to propane. Likewise, to reduce emissions to 0.21, the amount of abatement spending 
is $4000. Again, this matches the cost of emissions reduction achieved when CNG technology is used. As Table 1 
shows, CNG costs $4000-$6000 and emissions are reduced for small vehicles from 2.1 grams of CO per mile to 0.21. 
 
This equation shows, for example, that to reduce emissions to 0.84 it only requires $1000 per ultra low 
emission vehicle that currently emits 2.1 grams of emissions. However, for the larger Tier 1 vehicles, that emit 4.2 
grams of emissions, it would require $2000 per vehicle, and for trucks that emit 5.5 grams of CO per mile, it would 
require more than $2500 per vehicle to come close to the 0.84 grams of emissions achieved for only $1000 with ultra 
low emission vehicles. 
 
Now that the abatement cost functions have been specified, we have the information necessary to determine 
the level of emissions that will maximize profits for each firm. Since firms make decisions on the margin, in order to 
maximize profits each firm will seek to reduce emissions as long as the marginal benefit is greater than or equal to the 
marginal cost of emissions reduction. Therefore, the marginal cost and marginal benefit to each firm under each tax 
needs to be calculated. 
 
OPTIMAL EMISSIONS FOR FIRMS UNDER THE PMET 
 
The total cost function is needed to calculate the marginal cost of pollution reduction under the PMET. The 
first step to derive the total cost function is solving the abatement function in terms of additional cost per vehicle. 
 
 
Since the abatement function is:                 (2) 
 
Total cost can be found by multiplying additional cost per vehicle by quantity. 
 
                        (3) 
 
 
To find the marginal cost of emissions reduction for the PMET, the derivative of equation (3) with respect to 
emissions will be performed. These yields:  
constantabatement 
costadditional
1
emissions 
quantity
emissions
constantabatement 
reduction emissions ofcost  total 
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        (4) 
 
 
 Now that the marginal cost of emissions is known for the PMET, the marginal benefit of emissions reduction 
to the firm needs to be calculated. The benefit to the firm of reducing pollution under the PMET is simply the higher 
market price and greater number of units the firm can sell. 
 
The change in demand that results from the higher PMET is calculated as          where         (DGAS) is a 
proxy for the effect of the PMET on the price of vehicles.  
 
Therefore, the marginal benefit to the firm of emissions reduction is:  
 
DGAS * PMET* quantity of vehicles                      (5) 
 
Set marginal cost equal to marginal benefit to find the optimal level of emissions:  
 
                     (6) 
 
 
Solving for emissions yields: 
 
 
 
                       (7) 
 
 
 
The asterisk designates that this is the optimal amount of emissions under the PMET. Substituting the 
optimal emissions level into the abatement equation generates the additional cost per unit of achieving the optimal 
level of pollution reduction.  
 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS AND FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS  
 
Culp (2004), showed demand could be estimated in the automobile market by simply observing firm output 
and pricing decisions and by making certain assumptions about the structure of the automobile market. The four key 
assumptions of the Culp model are: 1) the automobile market consists of five homogeneous segments consisting of 
SUVs, pickups, luxury vehicles, large vehicles, and small vehicles. 2) The automobile market consists of five firms 
behaving in the Cournot-Nash framework. 3) The marginal cost of the last vehicle produced by each firm is not 
known but can be assumed to exist between certain ranges. 4) Firm production in one segment does not change the 
cost of producing a vehicle in another segment. Culp used this information to estimate own price elasticities for each 
vehicle segment. The first-order conditions derived in Culp (2004) based upon these assumptions are:  
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where p is the observed price in each segment, i is the firm for n=1 to 5, the subscript numbers indicate the vehicle 
segments, and n designates the segment for which the FOC is being applied.  
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Using the optimal level of emissions found above creates the following new first order conditions for the 
PMET: 
 
FOC under PMET 
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 For each i
th
 firm, where the first term is the new price consumers are willing to pay for vehicles given the 
higher travel costs, and where n is the segment for the type of vehicle being produced. How the change in vehicle 
operating costs affect the prices consumers are willing to pay for vehicles is shown by the inverse demand curves, 
discussed in the next section. The tax variables represent the additional production cost to each firm at the optimal 
level of emissions resulting from the abatement technology chosen, and MC is the marginal costs for each firm in each 
segment. The next section will examine how the PMET changes demand.  
 
CHANGE IN DEMAND CAUSED BY THE PMET 
 
The new price consumers are willing to pay is the original demand equation less the change in demand 
caused by PMET. The change in demand for vehicles caused by the PMET is represented by how consumers have 
reacted to changes in vehicle operating costs in the past, in particular, to gasoline prices. The change in demand in 
each segment is represented by the DGAS variables. These variables show the change in vehicle price in each segment 
caused by the change in per mile operating costs.  
 
Change in per mile operating costs under the PMET is the amount of the tax per unit of emissions times the 
emissions per mile, represented by the epm variables in the following equations. Therefore, the linearized demand 
equations developed in Culp are changed by subtracting  DGAS * PMET*EPM from each inverse demand equation. 
This equation shows the change in vehicle prices caused by the PMET. The following are the adjusted inverse 
demands for each i
th
 firm in each market segment under the PMET.  
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Where P
T
 is the price after PMET and in segment n and Q
T 
is the quantity in each segment after tax. 
 
OPTIMAL EMISSIONS FOR FIRMS UNDER THE LSET 
 
Since it is assumed that the incidence of per unit taxes does not change outcomes, the LSET will be placed on 
each firm rather than on consumers. Each firm benefits from lower emissions because it pays a lower tax on each 
vehicle it produces. Firms will then select the level of emission reduction that maximizes profits.  
 
The objective for each firm under the LSET is to maximize the following profit equation:  
 
         (11) 
 
where P is the vector of prices, Q is the vector of quantities, is the total cost of manufacturing, is the total cost of 
abatement and total taxes is the total of LSET taxes paid by the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
ingmanufacturTCabatementTC
 taxesTotalTCTCQPprofitMax abatementingmanufactur 
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Since it is assumed access to technology is the same under the LSET as under the PMET, the total cost of 
abatement function is: 
 
                (12) 
 
and the total amount of taxes each firm will pay is: 
 
          (13) 
 
where emissions is the vector of emissions in each segment, and LSET is the tax rate for each unit of emissions. 
 
Each firm will seek to maximize profits by changing the variables under its control. Each firm controls the 
quantity produced and the emissions of their vehicles. The optimal emissions for each firm can be found by taking the 
derivative with respect to emissions. 
 
Taking the derivative of the profit equation with respect to emissions yields: 
 
          (14) 
 
 
 
                     (15) 
 
 
 
                      (16) 
 
 
 
Setting FOC equal to zero and solving for emissions: 
 
                           (17) 
 
 
 
This is the optimal emissions for each firm under the LSET. Substituting the optimal emissions into the 
abatement function yields the additional per vehicle cost of these optimal emissions. Since it is known in 
environmental economic theory that a firm will continue to add abatement equipment until the marginal cost of the 
abatement equipment equals the tax, the change in per vehicle cost is equal to the per vehicle tax under the LSET.  
 
Therefore, each firm’s production cost will increase by the amount of the tax and each firm will have to pay 
an equal amount in taxes for each unit produced. Therefore, the marginal cost of both the tax and the increased 
production costs are twice the amount of the tax.  
 
The FOC for the LSET are the same as the original FOC for the LSET except the cost of the firm to produce 
has changed by both the amount of the tax and the increased production costs.  
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At optimal level of abatement, this is simply two times the amount of the tax.  
 
FOC under LSET 
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For each i
th
 firm for each vehicle segment n=1 to 5. The tax variables show the additional cost of production 
and the per vehicle tax producers pay. The inverse demand curves are the same as the ones found in earlier in this 
paper since vehicle characteristics are unchanged by the LSET.  
 
 Therefore, the only change to price that will occur will be caused by changes in the market equilibrium as the 
result of the increased marginal costs paid by each firm and the resulting decrease in output. The following are the 
inverse demand equations under the LSET. Where n is the segment in which the car is being produced and Q
T
 is the 
total market output in each of the five segments. 
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Social Welfare Optimization Comparisons under Each Tax 
 
Having developed the new FOC for the PMET and LSET, the impact of these taxes can now be analyzed. 
These first order conditions should result in different prices, levels of production, and levels of abatement technology 
implemented given different levels of taxation under the PMET and the LSET. From these market results, net 
emissions reduction under each tax will be determined, relevant consumer and producer surpluses calculated, and 
comparisons made between the two tax schemes. 
 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING RESULTS 
 
To evaluate each tax, an optimization program adjusts each tax rate until the PMET and the LSET reduce 
pollution by the same amount. Pollution reduction is set equal to avoid having to adjust for any extra pollution 
reduction. Since the value of pollution reduction is often debated, this would add another complication and another 
possible source of error to the model.  
 
While pollution reduction under each tax is the same, the amount of consumer surplus and producer surplus 
in each market under each tax will differ. The tax that creates more gains from trade in the automotive and travel 
markets while achieving the same amount of pollution reduction will be judged superior. 
 
Given that the other market conditions are the same for each tax, the optimization program will determine the 
largest possible difference in the total gains from trade achieved under one tax compared to the other. In doing this, 
the optimization program will adjust the tax rates, the coefficients of demand, and any other unknown variable. The 
program will also adjust each firm’s output so that first order conditions are satisfied for market equilibrium.  
 
The objective is to find if one tax is always superior to the other regardless of how market conditions change 
within their bounds. This would occur if the largest possible difference were always in favor of one tax.  
 
CALCULATION OF NET POLLUTION REDUCTION 
 
Both the PMET and LSET are levied on new cars. This is done so that each tax is placed on potentially the 
same number of consumers, and it is likely the government would phase in either tax so that fewer consumers would 
bear the burden of the tax, and thus, lessen political opposition.  
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As stated earlier, both reducing vehicle miles traveled and lowering emissions per mile achieve pollution 
reduction; however, if in response to these taxes some consumers decide to hold on to older, more polluting vehicles, 
the gains achieved by lower emissions on new vehicles will be offset by the increased presence of older vehicles 
remaining in service.  
 
Therefore, pollution reduction is calculated as: 
 
                (20) 
 
 
 
where:  
 
 
                (21) 
ehiclespolluter v gross-non oldest, by the caused emissionssales autoin  Decrease 
 
 
In estimating the additional emissions caused by consumers holding on to older vehicles, all lost vehicle sales 
are assumed to result in an old, non-gross polluting vehicle remaining in operation. Even though, it is assumed that 
each lost new vehicle sale causes an old vehicle to remain in operation, it is assumed that this old vehicle is not a gross 
polluter because of state and local inspection programs designed to eliminate such gross polluters. Instead, the 
pollution emitted from vehicles that would have been scrapped will be assumed equal to the average in-use emissions 
for vehicles. In-use emissions are obtained from remote sensing equipment of vehicles in use. The measurements 
taken vary greatly but the greatest preponderance of observations is between 5 and 10 grams of CO per mile (Wenzel, 
1999). Therefore, in this paper it will be assumed that vehicles that stay on the road emit 7.5 grams of CO per mile. 
 
EMISSION REDUCTION MECHANISMS UNDER THE PER MILE EMISSION TAX  
 
The first tax to be examined is the PMET. The PMET achieves pollution reduction by both encouraging 
producers to produce lower emission vehicles and by reducing vehicle miles traveled. To calculate the effectiveness of 
the PMET, a travel demand function needs to be estimated so the PMET’s impact on vehicle miles traveled and social 
welfare in the travel market can be determined. Next, the relationship between operating costs and vehicle sales will 
be explored so the PMET’s impact on new vehicle demand can be estimated.   
 
Estimation of Travel Demand with Respect to Operating Costs 
 
The demand for travel depends on many different factors, but of interest to this paper is how the price per 
mile traveled changes the quantity of vehicle miles traveled. A linear form of travel demand will be assumed of the 
following form:  
 
                     (22) 
 
The slope of travel demand has been the focus of other researchers and their results will be used in this paper. 
The slope measures how vehicle miles traveled changes with each change in price. If the slope, price, and quantity of 
travel are known, then the intercept can be calculated and a demand function can be estimated. In this paper, it is 
assumed that the price of travel is 25 cents per mile and that each vehicle owner travels 12,000 miles each year on 
average. The price of travel figure is approximately based on the reimbursement rate paid by the U.S. government 
(Federal Register, 1999) to its employees reflecting the additional cost of each mile traveled. 
 
The price of travel figure is used for vehicles of all sizes because the difference in the cost between small 
sedans and SUVs for maintenance, tire wear, and gasoline and oil used is only 3.2 cents (AAA, 2000). However, as a 
more practical matter, the elasticities for travel used in this paper from other studies are not broken down by vehicle 
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segment. In addition, the vehicle miles traveled figures are also averaged for all vehicle types. Therefore, using 
different vehicle operating costs depending on vehicle segment would be problematic because it is unknown from the 
aggregated studies whether the elasticity of travel demand and vehicle miles traveled is the same for all vehicle 
segments. Consequently, the value of travel will be estimated using average vehicle miles traveled and average per 
mile cost, and these will be assumed uniform for each segment.  
 
The average annual vehicle miles traveled per year is based on information collected by the Residential 
Transportation Energy Consumption Survey published by the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE survey 
estimated vehicle miles traveled at 11,400 miles per vehicle in 1994 and vehicle miles driven in the first year in 1994 
at 14,300 miles. Auto and tire manufacturers for warranty coverage purposes use a 12,000 mile per year figure. This 
figure is used not only by these companies, but also by the EPA report when it reports expected vehicle emissions. 
Because the 12,000 miles per year figure is in common use and close to the 1994 energy consumption figures, it is 
used for this paper.  
 
Now that price and quantity of travel are defined, the only remaining figure needed to calculate the intercept 
of travel demand is the slope of travel demand. Heninger and Shah (1998) calculate an elasticity of vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) with respect to gasoline prices per mile of –0.192. This means that a 1 percent increase in travel cost 
causes a 0.192 percent decrease in miles traveled. If the price of travel is $0.25 per mile, then a 4 percent increase in 
travel causes a one-cent increase in travel cost and a 0.768 percent drop in VMT. This would cause vehicle miles 
traveled for the average 12,000 miles per year consumer to drop by 92.16 miles. This figure is the slope of travel 
demand in cents.  
 
Solving the demand equation for the intercept and substituting generates the demand equation:  
 
Therefore, travel demand is: 
                                              (23) 
 
Now that travel demand has been determined, how the PMET changes travel demand will be estimated. 
 
Travel Demand under the PMET 
 
Since the PMET increases the price of travel, it will reduce the number of miles traveled. The size of the 
reduction also depends on the elasticity of supply. For this paper, it was assumed that supply in the travel market is 
perfectly elastic. This assumption is not unreasonable because commodity markets tend to have very elastic long run 
elasticities.  
 
With a perfectly elastic supply, any increase in travel cost is borne entirely by the consumer. This means that 
the PMET changes demand in the following manner: 
 
 
         (24) 
 
 
Now that the impact of the PMET on travel demand has been found, the next step is to establish how much 
increases in vehicle operating costs reduce vehicle sales so that the change in new vehicle sales under the PMET can 
be determined. 
 
 
cents 25miles/cent 92.16interceptmiles 12000 
miles 14304intercept
centsin  miles/cent miles 304,14 travel of price92.16demand Travel 
centsin  miles/cent miles , mile) per EmissionsPMETtravel of (Price92.1630414 
 demand Travel


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Impact of Operating Costs on New Vehicle Demand 
 
Since the PMET increases the cost of travel, an increase in its cost should change vehicle demand in the same 
way other increases in operating cost have changed demand for vehicles. Several studies have been performed on 
vehicle operating cost and sales. Most commonly, gasoline prices have been studied. Pritchard and DeBoer (1995) 
found vehicle sales elasticities with respect to gasoline prices between –0.096 and –0.107 depending on model in their 
1986 study. Berndt, Friedlaender, and Shaw-Er Wang Chaing (1990) found elasticity to be between –0.80 and –7.97 
for 1983 and in their multi-year study, their work showed an inelastic trend since1959. Finally Arguea, Hsiao, and 
Taylor (1994) found elasticity to be between –0.211 and –0.208 with respect to vehicle sales and miles per gallon 
characteristics, depending on the statistical method used.  
 
Since the Pritchard and DeBoer estimates for operating cost elasticity lie between the other studies’ 
estimates, their estimate of 0.107 for elasticity of operating cost to vehicle demand will be used to determine how 
vehicle prices change when vehicle operating costs increase on a per mile basis. 
 
First the gasoline elasticity must be converted to the impact of a per mile increase in cost on vehicle price, 
henceforth referred as DGAS.   
 
With elasticity of vehicle sales to gasoline prices = 
 
                      (25) 
 
 
Given gasoline prices were around $1 per gallon in 1989; this implies a one-cent increase is equivalent to a 
one percent increase in gasoline prices. In addition, with weighted fuel economy at about 26 miles per gallon in 1989, 
a one percent increase in gasoline prices would cause per mile vehicle operating cost to increase by 1/26 of a cent. 
Therefore, a 1/26 of a cent increase in per mile vehicle operating cost would result in a 0.107 percent drop in vehicle 
sales, based upon the elasticity of gasoline demand found by Pritchard and DeBoer. Consequently, a one cent increase 
in per mile operating costs ,which is to say a 26 cent/gal price increase, would cause vehicles sales to drop by 2.782 
percent. This is an elasticity of vehicle sales to per mile operating cost of 2.782.  
 
The percentage drop in vehicle sales due to per mile operating costs figure multiplied by the total sales in 
each segment represents the total sales lost per one-cent increase in per mile operating cost. However, since the 
demand equations in this paper are in inverse form, this figure must be divided by the inverse of the slope of inverse 
demand to determine the impact on vehicle prices. The result is the change in vehicle prices caused by a change in per 
mile operating costs, Dgas.  
 
Ideally, the value of DGAS would be calculated at each point with the current estimated slope of the demand 
curve; unfortunately, allowing these variables to vary exceeds the capacity of the global optimization program. 
However, Culp calculated the maximum and minimum coefficients of demand in each segment for each quarter. 
These maximum and minimum coefficients of demand will be used as constraints and the value of DGAS in the 
optimization program will be allowed to change within these bounds. 
 
Now that the influence of vehicle operating costs on sales has been specified, the pollution reduction 
achieved under the PMET can be estimated.  
 
POLLUTION REDUCTION CALCULATIONS UNDER PMET 
 
Pollution reduction is calculated as the difference between total emissions before the PMET less total 
emissions after the PMET has been implemented. Since it is assumed the PMET is on new vehicle sales, how the tax 
changes the behavior of those consumers who were planning on a new vehicle purchase is the relevant group. How 
pollution changes for this group will be calculated as follows:  
 
prices gasolinein  change %
sold  vehiclesofquantity in  change %
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           (26) 
 
 PMETafter  emissions Total   
 
          (27) 
 
 
 
         (28) 
 
 
 
 
               (29) 
 
 
 
It is assumed that VMT will not change for older vehicles due to the tax because it is assumed the cost of 
keeping older vehicles in operation is relatively insignificant and that consumers buy new vehicles for the amenities 
they offer rather than cost efficiency. 
 
Equation (27) shows the calculation for pollution reduction used in the global optimization program. Current 
emissions indicate the emissions of new vehicles before either tax is imposed. These values are set to 2.1 grams of CO 
per mile for small cars, which is the ultra low emission vehicle (ULEV) standard for vehicles, 5.5 grams for pickups 
and SUVs, and 4.2 for all other vehicles in accordance with vehicle emission standards in place by 1992.  
 
isegment in reduction Pollution 
 
 
         (30) 
 
 
 
For each i
th
 firm, where cepm is the current emissions per vehicle, CVMT is the current vehicle miles 
traveled before the PMET, VMT is the new vehicle miles traveled, epm is the new emissions per vehicle, mepm is the 
emissions per mile from the oldest, non-gross polluting vehicles, and lostsales is the difference between sales in the 
segment before and after the PMET.  
 
PMETunder reduction pollution  Total
 
 
              (31) 
 
 
Total pollution reduction is the sum of the pollution reduction achieved in each segment. Since the global 
optimization program requires variables to be of reasonably close scale, the pollution reduction figure in the 
optimization program is divided by one trillion.  
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EMISSION REDUCTION MECHANISMS UNDER THE LUMP SUM EMISSION TAX  
 
Pollution reduction under the LSET is only achieved when automakers reduce the emissions characteristics 
of their vehicles. Since the LSET does not change the cost of travel, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) will not change.  
 
POLLUTION REDUCTION CALCULATIONS UNDER LSET 
 
Pollution reduction is calculated as the difference between total emissions before the LSET, less total 
emissions after the LSET for those who would have purchased a vehicle before the tax. This is the same group as was 
used for the PMET. Equation (31) shows the calculation for pollution reduction used in the global optimization 
program. Since the LSET does not change vehicle operating costs, vehicle miles traveled are unchanged from before 
the LSET was imposed.  
out LSET sions withTotal emis    
 
 
                  (32) 
 
 r the LSETsions afteTotal emis   
 
 
     (33) 
 
ehicles from new vEmissions  
 
 
                  (34) 
 
 LSET for thebut  usein been  havenot  d that woul vehiclesfrom Emissions  
                (35) 
 
 
isegment in reduction Pollution 
 
 
                 (36) 
 
 
 
For each i
th
 firm, where cepm is the current emissions per vehicle, CVMT is the current vehicle miles 
traveled before the LSET, epm is the new emissions per vehicle, mepm is the emissions per mile from the oldest, non-
gross polluting vehicles, and lostsales is the difference between sales in the segment before and after the LSET. 
 
 
        (37) 
 
Total pollution reduction is the sum of the pollution reduction achieved in each segment. The pollution 
reduction figure in the global optimization program is divided by one trillion since the program requires variables to 
be of reasonably close scale. Now that pollution reduction under each tax has been calculated, the differences between 
total surplus under each tax will be calculated. 
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SOCIAL WELFARE CALCULATIONS 
 
Consumer Surplus 
 
Simple Walrasian surpluses were estimated from the linearized demand equations. However, since 
symmetric demands were assumed, this implies no income effect. Consequently, the Walrasian surplus measures of 
social welfare are identical to the compensated variation and equivalent variation measures of social welfare, and are 
determined in the following manner. Given the estimated demand curve for each of the five markets, the area under 
the relevant demand curve up to the point of equilibrium is calculated, as  
 
Producer Surplus 
 
 Producer surplus is calculated as the difference between the price the producer receives and its marginal cost 
of production and any abatement cost. Marginal cost is assumed constant over the relevant range. The following 
equations show the calculation of producer surplus in the auto market for each segment before either tax and under the 
LSET and the PMET.  
 
Surplus in the Travel Sector 
 
 Since the supply of travel is assumed perfectly elastic, there is no change in producer surplus under the 
PMET. To estimate consumer surplus in the travel sector, the travel demand function derived earlier will be used. 
Given the travel demand, consumer surplus (CS) before and after the tax can be calculated as follows: 
 
 
           (38) 
 
 
 
Where VMTi is the vehicle miles traveled in segment i, and the Q represents the quantity of new vehicles sold in the 
auto market. 
 
 
 
 
               (39) 
 
 
 
 
 
               (40) 
 
 
 
 
where lost salesi is the sales lost in segment i, and Qi is new vehicle sales in segment i.  
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Tax Revenue 
 
Anytime a tax is imposed, the gains from trade accrue not only to consumers and producers, but also to the 
government in the form of tax revenues. Since any tax revenue collected is revenue that could be redistributed to 
generate at least an equal amount of consumer surplus, tax revenue is included as part of the gains from trade for 
either tax. In fact, it has been argued that these tax revenues might produce a double dividend. A double dividend is 
believed to occur when a tax on a negative externality, such as pollution, not only reduces the undesirable activity but 
also generates tax revenue that can be used to reduce distortionary taxes in other markets. The case for the double 
dividend in environmental taxation has been made by Pearce, 1991. Pearce argues that carbon taxes could provide not 
only an environmental benefit, but allow taxes to be lowered on more elastic markets where welfare losses from taxes 
are higher. However, flaws in the double dividend approach have been found (Backhaus, 1995), (Schneider and 
Volkert, 1996), and some have argued that it could be negative (Bovenberg and Mooij, 1994). Therefore, since 
calculation of the double dividend would be problematic, any potential double dividend effect will be ignored.  
 
Calculation of Tax Revenue under PMET and LSET 
 
The PMET and LSET will each generate tax revenue. The following equations show the calculations used to 
estimate the amount of tax revenue in each market segment.  
 
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER PMET 
 
To ascertain the social welfare impacts of each tax, total gains from trade under each tax are derived. Total 
gains from trade before either tax is imposed are simply the sum of the total surplus in each segment and total surplus 
in the travel market. However, the PMET tax revenues are multiplied by 10 to represent the 10 years of tax revenues 
that should be collected given that vehicles achieve the EPA’s expected useful life of 10 years. For calculation 
purposes, any cost of tax collection is considered negligible. Therefore, total gains from trade under the PMET are 
calculated as:  
 
 
 
 
      (41) 
 
 
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER LSET 
 
In order to make a relevant comparison of the total gains from trade under the LSET and PMET, total gains 
from trade under the LSET must include the total surplus in the travel sector. Therefore, gains from trade under the 
LSET are calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
        (42) 
 
 
 
 
NET DIFFERENCE IN SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER EACH TAX  
 
The difference between the two surplus calculations in equations (41) and (42) show the advantage one tax 
has over the other in terms of social welfare when the demand curve, production costs, and level of pollution reduction 
are the same for each tax.  
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Optimization Program Calculation of Difference in Social Welfare 
 
In addition to the constraints already mentioned, a few additional constraints were needed. Since upper and 
lower limits for computer optimization program were needed, upper-bounds of $1500 per gram of CO were placed on 
the LSET, and 25 cents per mile per gram of CO were placed on the PMET. Bounds of one million units per segment 
per quarter were placed on the quantities that each firm could produce. These bounds were non-binding and therefore 
did not affect the optimization results. Finally, pollution reduction was arbitrarily set at 40 trillion grams of pollution 
reduction. This is approximately a 20 percent reduction in pollution levels from new vehicles.   
 
So far, travel demand with respect to per mile operating costs has been determined. Next, equations for net 
pollution reduction under the LSET and PMET were specified. Finally, consumer and producer surplus, tax revenue 
and total social welfare equations under each tax were created for the new automobile and travel markets. Next, the 
results of the computer program will be presented and analyzed using the equations and constraints defined earlier. 
 
Optimization Results and Influencing Factors 
 
In this paper so far, a computer optimization program was specified to determine the change in social welfare 
caused by the PMET and LSET for the same level of pollution reduction under each tax. Next, how consumer and 
producer behavior in response to each tax impacts social welfare will be discussed and the results of the optimization 
program will be examined.  
 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Two sets of results from the simulation of social welfare were generated. The first set shows the minimum 
value of the expression:  
 
         (43) 
 
Where 
 
 
 
 
                 (44) 
 
 
 
 
       (45) 
 
 
 
 
The optimization program uses expression (43) to find conditions under which the PMET produces more 
gains from trade than the LSET. A positive value would indicate that the LSET produces more gains from trade than 
the PMET even under the best conditions. A negative value would indicate, given certain market conditions that the 
total gains could be higher under the PMET.   
 
The second set of results from the simulation of social welfare show the minimum value of the expression: 
 
       (46) 
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The optimization program uses this expression to find conditions under which the LSET produces more gains 
from trade than the PMET. A positive value would indicate that the PMET produces more gains from trade than the 
LSET even under the best conditions. A negative value would indicate, given certain market conditions, that the total 
gains could be higher under the LSET. Table 2 shows the results of both the first set and second set of optimizations in 
millions of dollars. Consumer and producer surplus in each market under each tax when optimized for the LSET are 
shown, and consumer and producer surplus in each market when optimized for the PMET are shown. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that when conditions are set favorably to the PMET, the optimization program 
finds the PMET produces more gains from trade in all but five quarters. In those five quarters, regardless of the own 
price and cross price elasticities used, the LSET reduces pollution by the same amount as the PMET but always with 
more gains from trade. For example, in the fourth quarter the 109 figure indicates the PMET produces at best $109 
million less in gains from trade than the LSET even when the market conditions are optimized for the PMET. 
However, in most of the quarters the optimization program found market conditions where the PMET could be 
preferable to the LSET. For example, in the 32
nd
 quarter when conditions are optimally set to the PMET, the PMET 
produces up to $225 million more in surplus than the LSET. 
 
 
Table 2: Difference in Gains from Trade under each Tax 
 
Quarter Set 1: Optimized 
for the PMET 
Set 2:Optimized 
for the LSET 
 Quarter Set 1: Optimized 
for the PMET 
Set 2:Optimized 
for the LSET 
32 (225) (2,276)  16 13 (6,762) 
31 (214) (5,124)  15 (1,991) (3,795) 
30 (203) (3,649)  14 (259) (3,099) 
29 (1,044) (2,946)  13 (40) (3,926) 
28 168 (2,090)  12 (1,524) (1,688) 
27 (130) (2,582)  11 (1,782) (6,139) 
26 (152) (1,608)  10 (10) (3,549) 
25 (50) (2,334)  9 73 (1,160) 
24 (75) (3,909)  8 (2,108) (7,624) 
23 (141) (3,465)  7 (105) (3,773) 
22 (80) (6,029)  6 (120) (2,888) 
21 (142) (4,430)  5 (2,018) (4,187) 
20 (123) (3,151)  4 109 (1,369) 
19 (130) (3,276)  3 (80) (2,087) 
18 20 (4,594)  2 N/A N/A 
17 (2,122) (5,075)  1 (92) (3,234) 
 
 
These results show, in all but five quarters, either tax can be more efficient, given a certain set of market 
conditions. In the remaining five quarters, the LSET produces more gains from trade in this simulation. These results 
also show that when conditions are optimized for the LSET, the gap in gains from trade between the LSET and PMET 
can be very large, and when the results are optimized for the PMET, the gap in gains from trade between the two is 
relatively small. In fact, the average difference between the gains from trade is $470 million per quarter when 
optimized for the PMET, but almost $4 billion when optimized for the LSET. 
 
Although it appears that the LSET is preferable to the PMET, this may not be the case. If market conditions 
are more favorable to the PMET then it will have better results than the LSET except in those five quarters when the 
LSET was superior regardless of market conditions. All the gap between two indicates is that it is possible that the 
gains from trade under the LSET will be much larger than gains from trade under the PMET if the true market 
conditions are closer to those found when optimizing the results for the LSET. 
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PMET and LSET Rates Needed to Achieve Desired Pollution Reduction 
 
While the gains from trade calculations are the most important aspect of any economic analysis, it is 
sometimes difficult to relate how these figures really influence markets. Therefore, the median and lowest tax rates 
needed under the simulations to achieve the 40 trillion gram reduction in pollution are shown in Table 3. As stated 
previously, a 40 trillion gram reduction is approximately a 20 percent reduction in pollution levels.  
 
The results in Table 3 show that in order to achieve the same level of pollution reduction, consumers will pay 
more under the PMET than the LSET over 100,000 miles of travel. Consumers discounting of future payments made 
under the PMET influence these results, but are not the only factor influencing these results. These rates are the tax 
rates that achieve the desired pollution reduction after adjusting for lost vehicle sales, among other factors. For 
example, these tax rates include the impact of vehicle sales being lost and a greater tax rate being imposed to counter-
act the greater number of high emission vehicles remaining on the road.  
 
With those caveats in mind, and assuming ten equal payments over ten years time for 100,000 miles of travel, 
comparing the taxes collected by the LSET and the PMET at the lowest rates for each, imply consumers discount the 
future at 14 percent. Comparing the median tax rates for each implies a discount rate of 41 percent. These results 
likely indicate consumers highly discount future payments. This makes particular sense to new vehicle purchases 
because many consumers hold on to a new vehicle for only a couple of years and do not care about any fees paid 
beyond their term of ownership. Further, they likely estimate that the resale price of their vehicle to any future buyer 
will not be severely impacted by the PMET. A high discount rate is important because it means consumers will not 
respond to the PMET as policy makers would intend. That is, the PMET does not cause consumers to demand lower 
emission vehicles. This explains the social welfare results found in earlier.  
 
 
Table 3: PMET and LSET Tax Rates Needed to Achieve Desired Pollution Levels 
 
 Median tax rate per gram of 
emissions 
Lowest tax rate per gram of emissions 
PMET for each mile traveled 0.00666 0.00179 
PMET Total Paid after 100,000 miles 666.23 179.42 
LSET Total One-time Tax 155.74 93.03 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper applied Culp’s method of estimating demand by assuming certain market structures and firm 
behaviors, and determining from firm behavior what the elasticity of demand must have been to explain both market 
price and each firm’s output decision. Culp’s first order conditions were adapted to reflect the impact of the PMET 
and the LSET given the specified abatement cost function. Next, the PMET’s impact on consumer travel was 
estimated. Then, an optimization programs was used to compare the welfare impacts of each tax when the same level 
of pollution reduction was achieved under varying market conditions. Now, conclusions that can be drawn from the 
model will be discussed as well as the limitations of the model and areas for future research.  
 
CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE MODEL 
 
The results found in this paper, while tending to favor the LSET, do not indicate which tax produces more 
gains from trade in every quarter. In addition, this paper found the potential welfare losses under the PMET are greater 
than under the LSET. The PMET depends on three key factors to achieve pollution reduction: the elasticity of vehicle 
demand, the elasticity of travel demand, and the sensitivity of consumers to vehicle operating costs. Each of these 
factors introduces an element of uncertainty into how the market will react to the PMET. These elements of 
uncertainty create opportunities for the policy to encounter conditions that are not favorable and could explain why the 
potential losses under the PMET are potentially so much greater in some quarters than under the LSET. In other 
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words, because the effectiveness of the PMET depends on all these indirect and secondary incentives, and since the 
estimate of each varies, the optimization program found conditions where the PMET was extremely less effective than 
a LSET. 
 
Summarizing, the problem with the PMET is that it seeks to reduce pollution by increasing the cost of travel; 
however, reduced travel is not the primary objective of the PMET—reducing emissions is the objective. Ideally, the 
PMET seeks to encourage manufacturers to produce low emission vehicles. If the goal is to encourage firms to 
produce low emission vehicles, does it make sense to tax the travel market? This seems like a rather indirect way of 
achieving the desired result. Further, if market conditions are unfavorable, the welfare losses could be much higher 
under the PMET than the LSET because the PMET can damage both the market for new vehicles and the market for 
travel.    
 
While these results may just be a limitation of the model, this paper also reflects the difficulty of estimating 
the impact of the PMET. To implement either the PMET or the LSET the policy maker needs to know the own and 
cross price elasticity of demand. However, implementing the PMET additionally requires knowing both how 
consumer travel behavior will change, and how sensitive consumers are to vehicle operating costs. Because the 
potential welfare losses under the PMET could be much greater than under the LSET, policy makers hesitant to 
impose the PMET without better knowledge if market conditions are favorable its use. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
The analysis of the model is limited by the specification of a particular abatement function. Even if the 
specification of the abatement function is currently correct, it does not show the impact of technological change. It is 
reasonable to believe that firms would respond to either the PMET or LSET by researching new cost effective ways to 
reduce emissions. In the case of the PMET, firms might also attempt to reduce vehicle operating cost by methods 
other than reducing emissions, for example, firms might improve vehicle reliability. 
 
Another limitation of the model is that in estimating firm reactions to the changes in demand caused by each 
tax, the marginal cost of vehicle production for all future units is assumed to stay the same as the last unit produced 
before each tax was imposed. This assumption could under or overestimate the actual production costs. In addition, 
since the model does not place any limits on capacity, as demand shifts from one vehicle segment to another in 
response to each tax the new production levels might exceed the capacity of the firms to produce. In addition, the 
model does not take into account the possibility that new firms might enter the industry and alter the cost of 
production. 
 
This research is also limited by the use of linearized demand curves. While the revealed demand system used 
in this paper to estimate elasticities allows demand to take any form, linear or non-linear, the use of linearized 
demands to estimate post tax output levels and social welfare could cause problems. If the true demand relations are 
not linear, then as the new solutions get further away from the original output levels, the accuracy of the linearized 
demand curves will be reduced.  
 
Finally, this research is limited by the lack of accurate data regarding the true marginal cost of vehicle 
production. With better information, the accuracy of the model would be improved and the estimates of demand 
elasticities would have narrower ranges. 
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The revealed demand system used in this paper could also be applied to other oligopoly markets and 
products. It might be particularly useful in monopoly markets since the complexity of the model would be greatly 
reduced.  
 
Further, this paper examined two market-oriented policy instruments aimed at the automotive sector, the 
LSET and the PMET. However, policy makers are also considering market-oriented producer or consumer subsidies, 
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therefore research into these types of market-oriented solutions to the automobile pollution problem are needed. In 
addition, a better understanding of how market conditions influence the effectiveness of each tax and which market 
conditions favor the use of one tax over the other should be examined.  
 
Finally, this paper shows that the PMET’s losses could potentially be much larger than the LSET because the 
PMET depends upon indirect and secondary incentives to achieve its policy goal. Therefore, researchers should 
examine other areas of public policy for potentially large losses caused by policy makers’ use of indirect or secondary 
incentives.  
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